Failures of Project BioShield & Congressional Attempts to Remedy It by O\u27Reilly, Megan
DePaul Journal of Health Care Law 
Volume 10 
Issue 3 Spring 2007 Article 8 
October 2015 
Failures of Project BioShield & Congressional Attempts to 
Remedy It 
Megan O'Reilly 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl 
Recommended Citation 
Megan O'Reilly, Failures of Project BioShield & Congressional Attempts to Remedy It, 10 DePaul J. Health 
Care L. 503 (2007) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl/vol10/iss3/8 
This Case Briefs is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Health Care Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more 
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CASE BRIEF:
THE FAILURES OF PROJECT BIOSHIELD &
CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO REMEDY IT
Megan O'Reilly
I. THE THREAT OF A BIOLOGICAL TERROR ATTACK
In response to the 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States government
began a crash program to develop drugs, vaccine and diagnostic tests to
protect the nation from biological terrorism.' As part of this effort,
President Bush signed Project BioShield into law on July 21, 2004.
The legislation was intended to facilitate a faster process to research,
develop, purchase and make bioterrorism countermeasures available to
2
combat bioterrorist threats. However, Project BioShield is not
drawing the interest it aimed for. The legislation has faced significant
criticism because the law has failed to adequately provide consistent
and well-coordinated financing, and sufficient, ensured markets, as well
as any liability protection for vaccine developers. 3 The threat of a
biological attack is very real.4 To ensure that Project BioShield assists
in protecting the nation from future bioterrorist attacks, it is necessary
to evaluate the successes and setbacks the initiative has faced. In doing
so, this brief will examine: (1) the legislative intent of Project
BioShield; (2) the pharmaceutical market, and the impediments within
in the industry that cause it to refrain from researching and developing
bioterrorism countermeasures; (3) the effect of Project BioShield in the
pharmaceutical industry and its production of new drugs; (4) the
current legislative proposals attempting to address the law's alleged
failures; and (5) what else needs to be done to ensure that adequate
' Andrew Pollack, Untested Companies Enlist in US. Biodefense, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2003, at 3.
2 Sandra Basu, BioShield Not Drawing Interest it Aimed For (Nov. 2004), available
at: http://www.usmedicine.com/article.cfmn?articleID=967&isueID=68 (last visited
Oct. 12, 2006).
3 Business Wire, Project BioShield Success Depends on Ability to Guarantee
Consistent, Long-Term Financing, Markets and Indemnity for BioDefense Vaccine
Developers (Apr. 4, 2003), available at:
http://www.highbeam.com/DocPrint.aspx?DocId=1G1:99604540 (last visited Oct. 12,
2006).
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countermeasures are developed and America is prepared for a future
bioterrorist attack.
II. PROJECT BIOSHIELD
The looming threats of biological terrorism demand that the United
States develop clear strategies and dependable resources for defending
against and responding to potential public health emergencies.5 In
2002, the Centers for Disease Control determined that one of the most
serious vulnerabilities America faces is the fact that many potential
biological terrorism agents lack available countermeasures. 6
Pharmaceutical companies were electing not to manufacture
countermeasures because the market is relatively small and the profits
are limited. As a result, there was minimal economic incentive to
invest the resources necessary to bring a new treatment to market.7
Hoping to encourage the development of new bioterrorism
countermeasures, President George W. Bush proposed Project
BioShield in his 2003 State of the Union address. 8 The legislation was
intended to encourage the development of new bioterrorism
countermeasures. 9  On July 21, 2004, President Bush signed the
Project BioShield Act of 2004 into law. The law intended to: (1) relax
the procedures for bioterrorism-related procurement, hiring, and
awarding of research grants; (2) grant the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to, within his discretion, use an expedited
award process for grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements related
to biomedical countermeasure research and development activity; (3)
guarantee a federal government market for new biomedical
countermeasures; (4) permit emergency use of unapproved
countermeasures; and (5) require that the HHS Secretary submit annual
reports to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) about the
exercise of the authorities granted in the legislation. 10 The GAO is
charged with producing a report four years after the law's enactment to
assess actions taken under authorities granted by the act to determine
the act's effectiveness and recommend additional measures to address
5 Press Release, Eshoo and Rogers Introduce Biodefense Measure: Strategies,
Recourses Defend Against Terror Attacks, Pandemic Outbreaks ( June 7, 2006 ) (on
file with author).







the law's shortfalls. 1 The law did not appropriate any money for
implementation, however $5.593 billion was subsequently authorized
for FY 2004 to FY 2013.12 With this money, the administration hoped
that companies would be enticed to develop new drugs and vaccines for
anthrax, smallpox, botulism, Ebola, as well as other deadly diseases. 1
3
Project BioShield, which was intended to be a procurement
mechanism, allows the government to finance the stockpiling of
countermeasures for biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological
weapons. 14 Prior to awarding a contract, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) must make a "material threat determination.' 15 DHS
will evaluate the medical and public health consequences to the threat,
and then determine what medical countermeasures would be required to
mitigate that threat. 16 It is only after interagency consultation and
presidential approval that a contract will be awarded. Furthermore, the
government requires reasonable assurance that the specific
countermeasure will be available in "sufficient quantities" and will be
licensable by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).17 However, a
Project BioShield contract may provide that countermeasures not
licensed at the time of delivery can be purchased at a discount with a
bonus payable to the manufacturer upon FDA licensure. 18
III. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY'S REJECTION
OF PROJECT BIOSHIELD
Critics of Project Bioshield claim that the law has failed to deliver. 19
Despite initially pledging their support, large drug companies have
been unwilling to become involved with the law's efforts for a number
of reasons. First, federal agencies have historically taken months if not
years to decide which treatments they wanted and in what quantities.
The time cycles needed to secure BioShield investments are uncertain,
't Id.
12 Id. at 3.
13 Eric Lipton, Bid to Stockpile Bioterror Stymied by Setbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2006, at A6.
14 Luciana L. Borio and Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Anthrax Countermeasures. Current
Status and Future Needs, 3 BIOSECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE





19 Lipton, supra note 13.
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and companies cannot afford to halt product development if a particular
funding stream does not materialize. 20  Furthermore, the industry is
unsure of whether the BioShield initiative represents a long-term
government commitment of sufficient size to make the venture
worthwhile.
21
To ignite participation, the market created by BioShield must be
viewed as large enough to convince biotechnology companies that they
have a partner who understands the high costs, complexity, and
significant risk of developing therapeutics and bringing them to
market. 22 As it now stands, health scholars have stated that one reason
pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to get involved in Project
BioShield is because of the inept implementation of the program. This
has led the most well respected and best scientists to give up, look
elsewhere, or devote their resources to medical initiatives other than
biodefense.23
After an adequate and reliable market, the industry's greatest• • • 24
concern is indemnification. Larger pharmaceutical companies do not
want to assume the risks associated with developing countermeasures
because Project BioShield contains no liability protections for
manufacturers, even though the risk may be higher than for other
products. 25 The law allows products to bypass usual clinical trials,
required for FDA approval, but provides no protection against litigation
that would stem from possible adverse effects related to a bioterrorism
countermeasure. 26 The CEO of AVANT Immunotherapeutic stated that
a biotechnology company like AVANT "cannot afford to risk their
stockholders' investments and employees' livelihoods by venturing
into the biodefense realm where large portions of the population will be
inoculated in a program of administration over which we have little or
no control."' 27 Consequently, unless companies are protected to a fair
and reasonable degree from the risk of lawsuits, many in the
biotechnology industry have been unwilling to participate and assume
the risk. The pharmaceutical companies fear ensuing lawsuits could
20 Borio, supra note 14, at 109.
21 Business Wire, supra note 3.
22 Id.
23 Lipton, supra note 13.
24 Business Wire, supra note 3, at 2.
25 Borio, supra note 14, at 108.
26 Sarah Lister, An Overview of the US. Public Health System in the Context of
Emergency Preparedness, CRS Report RL31719, (March 17, 2005).
27 Business Wire, supra note 3, at 2.
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put them out of business just by their existence, rather than their
merit.
8
In addition to the fear of lawsuits, large pharmaceutical
companies are restrained by their obligations to their board of directors
and shareholders. The Securities and Exchange Commission's current
guidelines state that companies cannot count payments for products as
revenue unless the countermeasures are used.2 9 Consequently, not
recognizing the revenue from these government contracts could
potentially hurt reported profits and earnings per share, and as a result,
stock prices as well.
30
IV. PROJECT BIOSHILED & ANTHRAX
COUNTERMEASURES
With larger pharmaceutical companies unwilling or unable to
participate in Project BioShield, smaller companies have come to
dominate the biodefense countermeasure market.3'
However, attempts to stockpile an anthrax vaccine have magnified the
shortfalls of Project BioShield. As one senior health agency official
stated, the top three threats to this nation are "anthrax, anthrax,
anthrax."
32
The first Project BioShield contract dealt directly with anthrax
and was announced November 4, 2004.33 VaxGen Inc. was granted
$877.5 million to deliver 75 million doses of a new type of anthrax
vaccine within three years. 34 This award fueled doubts about the law
and drew complaints from Emergent BioSolutions, the maker of the
previously used anthrax vaccine, because VaxGen is a relatively small
28 id.
29 Borio, supra note 14, at 108.
30 id.
31 id.
32 Lipton, supra note 13. There have been problems with the current anthrax vaccine.
After the 2001 anthrax attacks, the health agency bought enough antibiotics for 41
million Americans, but recommended treatment supplements those drugs with a
vaccine. The vaccine the government already had for military personnel was seen as
ineffective based on the lengthy eighteen month treatment and the potentially fatal
side effects. Reports stated that at least six military personnel died and others
suffered serious complications, including lymphoma and multiple sclerosis. The
military finally stopped mandatory vaccinations in 2004 after soldiers complained and
filed lawsuits. Id.
33 Gottron, supra note 6, at 2.
3' Lipton, supra note 13.
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firm that had never taken a drug to the market.35 The company's
history included a failed AIDS drug in 2003, and financial troubles
which caused it to be barred from Nasdaq in 2004 for accounting
errors.36 The only other companies that bid on the new anthrax vaccine
were also relatively small with limited experience. 37 Larger companies
declined to bid on the anthrax vaccine due to the market limitations and
the fear of liability if someone became ill or died after being inoculated.
As a result of the potentially small market and limited profits, the larger
pharmaceutical companies saw the effort as unappealing and found
38little or no incentive to participate in the project.
Rather than trying to develop a new anthrax vaccine, Emergent
had been trying to persuade the government to buy hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of the already existing vaccine. Emergent
began an intense lobbying effort against the VaxGen vaccine to try and
persuade lawmakers to purchase Emergent's anthrax vaccine instead.
Emergent claimed that the VaxGen's new vaccine was based on a
modified version of the old one and also pointed to tests on the drug in
2005 which showed that an ingredient in the drug caused it to
decompose, making it impossible to survive in the emergency
stockpile.39
This exhaustive and expensive lobbying campaign has placed
other BioShield endeavors in jeopardy, as one critic noted: "the
maneuvering has been so intense, with lobbyists and media consultants
helping the companies undermine the competition, even some of the
people who have profited now express disgust. 'AO The
EmergentiVaxGen conflict is an additional reason larger
pharmaceutical companies would rather not get involved in Project
Bioshield. Consequently, Agency officials are scheduled to meet with
industry representatives to discuss a new strategy for Project
Bioshield.4 1 In the meantime, after spending millions of dollars, the
country still does not have the countermeasure needed to defend itself





39 Lipton, supra note 13.





V. POLICY PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS THE
SHORTFALLS OF PROJECT BIOSHIELD
In an effort to entice more companies to develop countermeasures and
expand the scope of Project BioShield, Congress has introduced and
passed additional legislation to address the concerns raised by some of
the larger pharmaceutical companies. For companies developing
countermeasures, Congress included a limited liability provision in the
2006 Defense Appropriations Act. The indemnification provision
seeks to address the concerns surrounding the risk of litigation
stemming from adverse effects.
43
Advocates of Project Bioshield claim changes also need to be
made within the contracting authority of Project BioShield. They claim
that the process would be more effective if modeled after that used by
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which
44
also fund high risk projects. DARPA contracts usually only last a
few years and can be renewed only when specific milestones are met.45
While the fear may be that the government would be funding countless
risky development projects that will never make it to market, the
contracts could be structured so that this assumption of development
risk translates into lower procurement costs.
4 6
VI. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS OF THE 109TH
CONGRESS 47
As the 109th Congress comes to an end in December 2006, many of the
bills introduced to expand Project BioShield and encourage the
development of additional countermeasures are in jeopardy of dying in
Committee. Legislation introduced during the 109th Congress
included: (1) the Protecting America in the War on Terror Act of 2005;
(2) the Project BioShield II Act of 2005; (3) the Biodefense and
Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2005; (4) the
Biodefense and Pandemic Preparedness Act of 2005; and (5) the
Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine Drug Development Act of 2006.48
43 Gottron, supra note 6, at 4.
44 Id. at 5.
45 id.
46 Id.
47 The 109'h Congress convened from January 2005- December 2006, available at:
http://www.house.gov/Welcome.shtml, (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
48 Id.
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While the language contained in these bills may differ, they
share many similar provisions and share the goal of generating the tools
and resources necessary to develop effective biological weapon
countermeasures. These legislative initiatives proposed to: (1) include
detection technologies and expand the categories of products eligible to
be purchased with BioShield funds; (2) offer additional financial
incentives to encourage countermeasure development, including market
based such as exclusivity agreements, and lengthening exclusivity
terms and patent extensions; (3) grant antitrust exemptions for
communications between the government and industry; and (4) require
that the Food and Drug Administration assist developers and
manufacturers during the licensing process.49
On September 27, 2006, the House of Representatives
unanimously passed the Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug
Development Act of 2006 (H.R. 5533).50 The legislation, sponsored by
Congresswoman Anna G. Eshoo (D-CA) and Congressman Mike
Rogers (R-MI), seeks to ensure that more bioterrosim countermeasures
are made available in the market. The concern this legislation
addresses is the fact that many promising countermeasures are not
making it through the advanced research and development necessary to
bring projects to the point of eligibility for Project BioShield. They are
dying in the "Valley of Death," which refers to the period between
early-stage research and commercialization.5' Specifically, the
legislation would: (1) reorganize and enhance activities in HHS into
the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
(BARDA); (2) expand countermeasures covered by Project BioShield
to include infectious diseases; (3) create an FDA rapid-action team to
assist manufacturers to avert shortages of a vaccine or countermeasure;
(4) allow HHS to enter into exclusive sales contracts for a particular
product; (5) permit BioShield contracts to receive advance payments
for meeting specified milestones; and (6) allow other executive
agencies to order countermeasures through HHS.52
49 Gottron, supra note 6, at 6.
50 Press Release, U.S. House Passes Eshoo Biodefense Bill (Sept. 27, 2006) (on file
with author).
51 HOUSE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE, 109TH CONG., H.R. 5533,
Rogers/Eshoo BARDA Bill Needed to Foster Stronger Biodefense (Sept. 2006).
52 Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2006: Hearing
on H.R. 5533 Before the House Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. ,
Talking points of Congresswoman Anna G. Eshoo, Member, House Comm. On
Energy and Commerce (2006) (on file with author).
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It is unclear what the future of this legislation will be. The
Senate companion bill, S. 3678 is awaiting consideration by the full
Senate.53 The Bill's Senate sponsor, Senator Richard Burr of North
Carolina, believes that the Senate will vote on the legislation before the
109th Congress adjourns.54
VII. CONCLUSION
The threat of a biological attack is very real and the consequences of
such an attack could undoubtedly be catastrophic. While it is
incredibly difficult to estimate what a future attack will entail, the
implementation of Project BioShield has created unnecessary obstacles
to adequate preparation for such an attack. Stalled legislation and
feuding pharmaceutical companies stand in the way of developing the
measures needed to combat a biological attack. However, larger
pharmaceutical companies may be motivated by the market to engage
in Project BioShield should Congress address their indemnification
concerns. The future development of bioterrorism countermeasures is
likely to focus on the production of new vaccines, which are generally
more profitable than old ones. Furthermore, biologicals have a limited
shelf life and will need to be replaced in stockpile after several years,
which could create additional incentives for manufacturers to compete
for contracts that will last for several cycles.55 With over $5.6 billion
over the next 10 years allocated to the procurement of bioterrorism
countermeasures, Congress will likely continue to introduce new
legislation to address the concerns expressed by the industry in an
effort to ensure that this country is equipped with the most effective
countermeasures possible in the wake of a bioterrorist attack.
53 U.S. House Passes Eshoo Biodefense Bill, supra note 51.
14 E-mail from Jennifer Nieto, Legislative Assistant, Congresswoman Anna G. Eshoo
(Sept. 22, 2006, 10:45:59 CST) (on file with author).
55 Borio, supra note 14, at 108.
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